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1 Introduction 
 
 
Intergenerational mobility is concerned with the relationship between the socio-economic 
status of parents and the socio-economic outcomes of their children as adults.  This can be 
measured in a variety of ways, by income and earnings, social class or status, or education. If 
an individual‟s income/social class/education is strongly related to his or her parental 
background, this means that a child from a poor family is unlikely to escape his or her start in 
life and consequently inequality will perpetuate. This has implications for economic 
efficiency if the talents of those from poorer families are under-developed or not fully 
utilized, as those from poorer backgrounds will not live up to their productive potential. 
 
Most people would agree that equality of opportunity is an important goal; nonetheless it is 
difficult to imagine a world with no link between outcomes across generations. Genetic 
transmissions alone are likely to lead to a positive association between the educational 
achievements, career prospects and earning power of parents and children, while learning 
within the family will lead to children from better-off families being better equipped to 
succeed. Hence the policy implications of the study of intergenerational mobility are unclear. 
If intergenerational income inequality is solely a consequence of the automatic transmissions 
of ability and other attributes within the family, its reduction would require strong 
intervention by the state, and might lead to inefficiency. Our understanding of this can be 
improved by making comparisons of the levels of intergenerational mobility across countries. 
With comparisons in hand, it is possible to assess mobility as „relatively weak‟ and „relatively 
strong‟, and then begin to consider potential explanations for differences in intergenerational 
mobility.  
 
The first task in this paper is to summarise the literature on the relative strength of 
intergenerational mobility across different countries.  In contrast to most other summaries, 
work on income, social class, social status and education will all be considered with 
observations of mobility included from 65 countries.  If our question of interest is „How does 
the importance of the influence of parental background for children‟s outcomes differ across 
countries?‟ it does not seem reasonable to concentrate only on one measure of background 
and outcome. In addition we know there is a great deal of uncertainty about comparisons 
made on the basis of the income mobility literature (as highlighted in Björklund and Jäntti, 
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2008). It is therefore helpful to look at how estimates compare across different literatures. In 
doing so, we consider methodological issues carefully and select our „preferred estimates‟ for 
each measurement approach to represent the most comparable picture of mobility across 
countries.  
 
We find that the different measures used tend to be fairly well correlated, with South America 
and southern Europe having low mobility and the Nordic nations being rather more mobile. 
Measures of the association of social class across generations (social class fluidity) are the 
exception to this, with if anything, a negative relationship between the country rankings on 
these measures and others.  We shall examine the possible reasons for this difference later in 
the paper. 
 
In the second part of the paper we begin with a short review of the theoretical literature that 
seeks to model the determinants of intergenerational mobility within society.  This includes 
income inequality, educational investment, and returns to education.  Finally we take our 
preferred measures of mobility and correlate them with these variables paying particular 
attention to contrasting results from our measures of income, educational and occupational 
mobility.  We find evidence that income, status and educational mobility are all related to 
inequality, education spending and the returns to education. 
 
These descriptive correlations cannot be thought of as painting a picture of the causal 
relationships that drive intergenerational mobility.  However, owing to the intense interest in 
the relationship between inequality and immobility, it seems worthwhile to explore the extent 
of our knowledge in this area.  In the conclusions remarks are made about the policy 
implications of the results presented here and we are also careful to discuss the further 
evidence required to make more concrete suggestions about how public policy could be used 
to promote mobility. 
  
 
2 Measures and Concepts 
 
 
Before we can review the empirical literature on mobility we need to gain a solid 
understanding of the methodologies used by the different measurement approaches, and the 
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main data features that can influence the estimates obtained.  This understanding is essential 
in making international comparisons, as an inconsistent measurement approach can lead to 
invalid inferences about the difference in mobility across countries.  We begin by reviewing 
the key methodological issues that arise in obtaining estimates of income mobility, an issue 
that has achieved substantial attention in recent years.  We then discuss the measures and 
concepts used when social status, class and education are used as outcome measures. In 
conclusion we provide a review of the relationship between measures based on different 
outcomes, this provides a framework to interpret differences in the country rankings provided 
by different measures.  
 
 
Income mobility 
 
Measures of intergenerational earnings and income mobility are based on estimation of   in 
the following model: 
 
ln lnchild parents parents childi i i i iY Y age age          (1) 
 
where ln childiY is the log of some measure of earnings or income for adult children, and 
ln parentsiY is the log of income or earnings for parents, i identifies the family to which parents 
and children belong and i is an error term.   is therefore the average elasticity of children‟s 
income with respect to their parents‟ income.1 
 
Hypothetically, 0   represents a case of complete mobility where the incomes of parents 
and children are completely unrelated, and 1   represents a case of complete immobility 
where the proportionate earnings advantage of parents is precisely mirrored in their children‟s 
generation. Estimates of   tend to lie between 0 and 1, implying that an initial income 
advantage will be wiped out over several generations.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 This linear formation is common, but see Bratsberg et al (2007) for a discussion of how international 
comparisons are affected by allowing for nonlinear relationships in earnings across generations.  
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Intergenerational mobility can also be measured by the partial correlation of parents‟ and 
children‟s incomes. This adjusts for differences in income variance between the two 
generations.   Mobility can be thought of as measured by 1-r.  
 
parents child
ln |
lnY , lnY ln |
=Corr ( )
parents
child
Y age
Y age
SD
r
SD
  
(2) 
 
Economic mobility can be measured either through income or earnings; in reality, the 
literature is dominated by estimates of the elasticity of sons‟ earnings with respect to fathers‟ 
earnings.  This means that the importance of non-labour income is not acknowledged, those 
without paid employment are dropped and that the experience of women as both mothers and 
daughters has been frequently neglected (Chadwick and Solon, 2002, is a notable exception 
regarding daughters).   As this paper is seeking comparable measures of mobility we also 
focus on the earnings mobility of men, but this does not mean that other measures are 
uninteresting, and they certainly deserve more widespread attention.  
 
Models of intergenerational persistence
2
 tend to imply that the measurement of 
intergenerational mobility should be based on the permanent income of parents and children; 
unfortunately in datasets where incomes of both generations are available they are often only 
short-term measures.  Under classical measurement error assumptions
3
 it is straightforward to 
show that measurement error in the dependent variable (the child‟s income) will not bias the 
estimate of  , although it will lead to a loss of precision and larger standard errors. As 
discussed by Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992), measurement error in the explanatory 
variable has more serious implications and will lead to inconsistent estimates of  . Indeed, 
the estimated parameter, ˆ , will be an underestimate of the true  , as shown in equation (3), 
where 2y  and 
2
u  are the variances of fathers‟ permanent income and the error, respectively.  
2
2 2
ˆlim
y
y u
p

 
 


 
(3) 
                                                 
2
 See Goldberger (1989) for a discussion of how inherited endowments lead to intergenerational persistence and 
Solon (2004) for a model based on parental investments. Both lead us to expect that permanent income is the 
relevant concept.  
3
 These assumptions are that the level of iy  is uncorrelated with the size of the measurement error, and that 
errors are uncorrelated across generations. 
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 It is clear that the „signal to noise‟ ratio (
2
2 2
y
y u

 
) is crucial to obtaining accurate estimates 
of intergenerational persistence. If the variance of the error contained in parents measured 
income is small compared to the true variance of permanent income, then ˆ  will be close to 
  and we will have a good estimate of intergenerational persistence. 
 
One strategy for reducing the downward bias associated with measurement error is to average 
parental income over several periods to come closer to a measure of permanent income. 
Under the classical measurement error model there will be a fall in the attenuating factor as 
more periods of data are used to generate the average, as shown in equation (4). As T 
approaches infinity, 
2
u
T

 will converge to zero and ˆ will approach the true value of  . 
 
2
2
2
ˆlim
y
u
y
p
T

 




 
(4) 
 
Work by Mazumder (2005) has shown that Solon‟s approach to solving measurement error 
by averaging parental income over five years or so may not be sufficient to overcome 
measurement error as the observations used are generally too close together to be truly 
representative of lifecycle income.  
 
This topic is taken up in a rigorous way by Haider and Solon (2006). The starting point of 
their article is that the classical measurement error formulation is inappropriate as the 
relationship between permanent income and current income varies through the lifecycle.
 4
 As 
described by Mincer (1974), age–earnings profiles are steeper for those with more human 
capital (higher permanent incomes). Hence, at young ages current income is low compared to 
permanent income for those with high permanent income, while at older ages current income 
is higher compared to permanent income for those with high permanent income. 
 
                                                 
4
 Haider and Solon‟s paper has been followed up by Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) using Swedish tax register 
data.  The Swedish authors find that the broad patterns found for the US also hold in Sweden.  
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Haider and Solon (2006) show that with this type of measurement error the direction of the 
bias is determined by the age at which earnings are observed.  In addition, and unlike the 
classical case, measurement error in the dependent variable (children‟s incomes) will have an 
impact. The data used for intergenerational mobility often focuses on young sons and older 
fathers. Haider and Solon show that this combination is likely to lead to downward bias 
through both the dependent variable and the explanatory variables, and possibly to substantial 
underestimation. To minimize the extent of measurement error, incomes for both generations 
should be taken at the point when they are most representative of permanent income. Haider 
and Solon (2006) estimate this to occur at around the age of 42. Reville‟s (1995) empirical 
results support Haider and Solon‟s hypotheses. He finds evidence that ˆ  rises substantially 
with the age at which sons‟ earnings are observed, particularly between ages 27 and 31.  
 
An alternative solution to the classical measurement error problem is to use instrumental 
variables (IV). A valid IV is correlated with fathers‟ permanent income but uncorrelated with 
measurement error. In addition it should not independently affect children‟s economic status. 
The obstacle to using instrumental variables in this context is that almost every variable that 
is correlated with parents‟ permanent income might also have an independent impact on sons‟ 
status.  This leads to an unambiguous upward bias in IV estimates of intergenerational 
persistence, meaning that they tend to provide an upper bound on the true extent of 
intergenerational transmission in a country.  
 
The standard measurement approach requires information parental incomes and then 
children‟s incomes twenty or thirty years down the line, this severely limits the number of 
countries for whom intergenerational mobility can be estimated.  Björklund and Jäntti (1997) 
use a variation of the instrumental variables technique to overcome this problem for Sweden 
in a way that has become increasingly popular and has enabled a large expansion in the 
number of countries for which we have information on intergenerational income mobility.  
 
The Two-Stage Instrumental Variable approach (TSIV) is used when researchers have 
matched information on sons‟ earnings and fathers‟ characteristics (such as education and 
occupation) but no information on fathers‟ earnings. Fathers‟ earnings during the child‟s 
teenage years are predicted using information on the relationship between earnings and 
education from other data. Sons‟ earnings were then regressed upon this prediction. Subject 
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to certain assumptions, this estimator will be upward biased in the same way as other IV 
estimators. As discussed by Ermisch and Nicoletti (2007) the extent of the bias will depend 
upon the degree to which the instruments are directly related to the child‟s income and the 
strength of their ability to predict father‟s earnings.  The larger the R-squared in the first-
stage regression the smaller the bias will be. More recently this approach has been extended 
to Italy (Mocetti, 2007, Piraino, 2007), France (LeFranc and Tannoy, 2005) and in the 
international comparison by Andrews and Leigh (forthcoming).  
 
In making international comparisons of intergenerational income mobility it is therefore 
essential to take account of the issues highlighted above; the approach taken to measurement 
error and the age of the fathers and children when earnings are measured.  
 
 
Socio-economic mobility and social class fluidity  
 
Measuring mobility by the statistical association of income or earnings across generations is 
actually a rather recent literature, with the majority of breakthroughs occurring since 1990.   
Much more established is the measurement of mobility by the links between social class or 
occupational status of fathers and sons.  
 
One advantage of measuring intergenerational mobility by class or occupation is that the data 
restrictions are much less stringent, retrospective information on father‟s occupation is not 
difficult to collect and does not require the investment in longitudinal data necessary for 
intergenerational income studies. We may also think that occupation, broadly defined, varies 
less over the lifecycle making age–related biases less problematic. However, the difficulty 
with making international comparisons of mobility in social class or occupation across 
generations is the need for the measures to be comparable.  This is a huge undertaking and 
has led to some large scale international projects and considerable controversy within the 
sociology discipline.  
 
One approach to measuring mobility taken by sociologists is to create an index of socio-
economic status (SEI) associated with occupations, match this index to fathers‟ and sons‟ 
occupations and then associate this index across generations.  Generally the index depends on 
a weighted contribution of the average income and education within an occupation (where 
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weightings are chosen to maximise the relationship between the index and the education and 
earnings of occupations). Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996, 2003) have worked extensively on 
applying this approach across countries and we discuss some of their results below. These 
socio-economic indices can be correlated across generations using similar approaches to 
those reviewed in the measurement of income mobility. The strength of these correlations can 
then be compared across countries.  The raw correlations are often not the focus of papers; 
this data is more commonly used in structural models that distinguish the degree to which the 
child‟s education acts as a transmission mechanism for parent and child socio-economic 
status.  Another approach, as in Ganzeboom and Treiman (2007), is to use the correlations as 
explanatory variables in a structural panel model which seeks to explain why 
intergenerational mobility varies across nations and time. 
 
An alternative approach to measuring mobility is based on class.   Class divisions are also 
based on occupation but are formed of broad occupational groupings, which are supposedly 
un-ordered. For example, a frequently used schema is based on Erikson et al (1979).  
 
I + II Service class Professionals, administrators and managers; higher-grade technicians; 
supervisors of non-manual workers 
III Routine non-
manual workers 
Routine non-manual employees in administration and commerce; sales 
personnel; other rank-and-file service workers 
IVa + b Petty 
bourgeoisie 
Small proprietors and artisans, etc., with and without employees 
IVc Farmers Farmers, small holders and other self-empoyed workers in primary production 
V + VI Skilled 
workers 
Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers; skilled manual 
workers 
VIIa Non-skilled 
workers 
Semi- and unskilled manual workers (not in agriculture, etc.) 
VIIb Agricultural 
labourers 
Agricultural and other workers in primary production 
 
As social class is not a continuous variable, the measurement of social class fluidity (as it is 
commonly called) is based on the analysis of two-way contingency tables which document 
the moves between classes across generations.   Modelling the patterns of mobility in 
contingency tables is a more difficult enterprise than correlating continuous variables and a 
large literature has evolved on how this can best be achieved.  The major difficulty stems 
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from the fact that structural class shifts between generations will necessarily force some 
families away from the diagonal; increasing the appearance of absolute mobility.  As a 
consequence it is important to have a measure of relative mobility which is invariant to 
compositional changes across generations.  
 
Relative mobility is defined in terms of the odds ratios. For a 2x2 contingency table this is 
11 22
12 21
( )
F F
F F


 where ijF is the frequency of observations in cell ij where i and j  index father and 
son‟s classes respectively. Each set of four cells in the contingency table will generate an 
odds ratio, taken together these provide a complete description of the patterns of mobility in 
the data.   Log linear models provide a more parsimonious way of describing the total pattern 
of mobility in a contingency table.  
 
If we take as the dependent variable ijF then this can be explained by a scaling parameter μ, 
the influence of the origin class i , the influence of the destination class, j and the influence 
of the association between origins and destinations for this particular cell, ij .  
So that ij i j ijF    for all i and j.  
 
If we take logs of this model it becomes linear 
 
ln O D ODij i j ijF         (5) 
 
In this way the model is fully saturated by the inclusion of origin (superscript O), destination 
(superscript D) and full interaction effects (OD), so the frequencies in each cell will be 
predicted perfectly. In a model of perfect relative mobility the 
OD
ij terms will be equal to 
zero.  The aim of log linear modelling is to avoid including all the ODij  terms but still achieve 
an acceptable fit for the model.  The 
OD
ij terms omitted depends on the particular pattern of 
mobility the researcher has in mind, models depicting different mobility schemes can be 
evaluated depending on how well they fit the observed data. For more detail on the precise 
nature of these models see Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) or Breen (2004). 
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When a cross country approach is taken a third dimension is added to the model, k.  If the 
researcher believes that association effects are common across countries the log linear model 
becomes.  
 
ln O D C OC DC ODij i j k ik jk ijF               (6) 
 
A way of measuring variations in fluidity across nations is to examine how well this model 
performs; if it provides a good fit then this indicates that variation in the extent of class 
associations across countries is limited.   Models allowing variations in the extent of 
particular origin-destination effects across countries enable a more complex pattern of 
similarities and differences to be built up.  
 
Erikson and Goldthorpe‟s book The Constant Flux compared the extent of class fluidity for a 
number of countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  The study initially concentrated on 
Europe with England and Wales, France, Northern Ireland, Scotland, the Republic of Ireland, 
West Germany, Sweden, Poland, and Hungary all examined closely. Analysis was also added 
for Czechoslovakia, Italy, the Netherlands the United States, Australia, and Japan.   More 
recently Breen (2004) has followed up this study with an analysis of 11 countries, with 
significant overlap with those included by Erikson and Goldthorpe, Breen‟s aim is to 
understand trends in mobility for these countries from the 1970s onwards.  
 
The models estimated in both of these books produce a very large number of parameters, and 
a great deal of detail on changing mobility patterns.  For the purpose of this summary we 
would benefit greatly from a single mobility parameter for each nation and point in time.  
Erikson and Goldthorpe‟s (1992) UniDiff model provides such a statistic.  
 
ln O D C OC DC ODij i j k ik jk ij k ijF X                (7) 
 
ijX  depicts some general pattern of mobility and the coefficient k indicates how the strength 
of the association varies across countries. k  is normalised to some baseline so that a 
relatively high k  indicates relatively low mobility and a low k indicates high mobility.  
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This has necessarily been a very brief introduction to measuring social class fluidity.  
However it should hopefully give some intuition about the processes involved in the complex 
world of log linear modelling, and give an idea of how these methods have been used to draw 
comparisons across countries.   
 
 
Educational persistence across generations 
 
An alternative measure of mobility is the extent to which parents and children‟s education are 
related.  The literatures on intergenerational income and social class or status persistence 
emphasise the role of education as a transmission mechanism; it seems natural to measure 
this association directly.  
 
As with occupation, information on educational achievements across generations is quite 
widely available.  Once again there are difficulties in ensuring that education has the same 
meaning across countries. One approach is to measure education in years of schooling, 
assuming that the meaning of this variable is constant across nations and generations.  In this 
case educational persistence can be measured using the intergenerational coefficient and 
correlation, similar to the approach used for income mobility.  
 
children parents
i i iYearsEd YearsEd u     
and parents childYearsEd , YearsEdCorr ( )
parents
child
YearsEd
YearsEd
SD
SD
  
(8) 
(9) 
  
Cross national comparisons and 50 year trends in the coefficient and correlation of years of 
schooling have recently been presented by Hertz et al (2007) for 42 nations.  We will draw 
heavily on this work when we come to summarise the international findings.  
 
The above approach assumes (as does the measurement of income mobility, as presented 
here) that the impact of years of education on the next generation is linear and monotonic.   It 
seems unlikely that this will be true, and even more unlikely that this will be true in all 
countries.  As an example, the structure of the UK schooling system means that it is 
inappropriate to estimate simple years of schooling effects here (Dearden et al, 2002).  To 
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overcome this problem we might wish to consider education in terms of qualification levels.   
This is more demanding in terms of cross-national comparability.  Chevalier et al (2009) use 
the UNESCO designed ISCED classification as the basis of the five-category coding of 
education to measure the intergenerational association of education in Europe and the US.   
 
Using a categorical measure raises difficulties of the type faced in the social class fluidity 
literature: how can we measure associations in education across generations as successive 
generations become more educated?  The approach taken to this question by Chevalier et al is 
to model the associations in education by two measures; the eigen value index which 
summarises the degree of mobility implicit in a transition matrix – how rapidly parental 
education origin is forgotten - and the Bartholomew index which computes the average 
number of categories moved between generations.
5
  Chevalier et al find a relatively weak 
correlation between these two measures.  It seems that the modelling approach taken to 
education persistence matters.  We will consider in more detail how different measures 
change country rankings in Section 3.  
 
 
Conceptual links across the measures 
 
Taking first the relationship between income and education measures of mobility. 
Recall the linear model of intergenerational income mobility (omitting age controls): 
 
ln lnchildren parentsik k k ik ikY Y       (10) 
 
where the subscript k indicates that the mobility relationship varies across countries. 
In each generation education has a return in the labour market so that  
                                                 
5
 
21Eigen value index        
where  2 is the second largest eigen value, the largest eigen value of any transition matrix is one. If  2 is equal 
to zero then the transition matrix equals to the limiting invariant matrix and corresponds to equality of 
opportunity. 
 
i j
ij jifB      
f ij is the joint frequency in the i,jth cell of the transition index and the modulus of (i-j)  is the number of changes 
in education level made from one generation to the next. In essence it is summarizing how far the population is 
from the principal diagonal of the matrix. 
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1ln
parent parent parent
k k k ik ikY Ed v     
and 2ln
child child child
ij k k ik ikY Ed u    .  
(11) 
(12) 
 
k is a linear measure of the persistence of education across generations. It can be easily be 
shown that the relationship between k  and k  is:  
 
( , ) ( , ) ( , )1
.
( ) ( ) ( )
ik ik ik
ik ik
child child parentschild
k ik ik ikk
k kparents parents parents
k ik k
Cov Ed v Cov u Ed Cov u v
Var v Var Ed Var v

 
 
     
(13) 
 
The first term gives the relationship between intergenerational mobility in income and 
earnings if education were the only route for intergenerational transmission.  In this case the 
relationship between the two would be moderated by the relative size of returns to education, 
if returns to education increase across generations then income persistence will be higher than 
educational persistence and vice versa.  The second term is the impact of the relationship 
between parental income (orthogonal to education) and child‟s education while the third term 
is the other cross effect between parental education and the child‟s residual earnings.  The 
final component shows the relationship across generations of those components of 
earnings/income that are independent of education.  It is clear that while income and 
education persistence are likely to have a positive correlation there are many other 
components which will lead to this correlation being less than one.  One important element of 
this is the extent to which parental income and education influence iku , which can be thought 
of as the within-education inequality in income. 
 
It is easy to see how the above equation could be modified to express the relationship 
between socio-economic status mobility and income mobility, with k instead indicating the 
association between status and the k terms giving the income return to status. Björklund and 
Jäntti (2000) assert that differences in the extent of mobility by income and social class can 
be explained by the extent of inequality; the US is rather immobile on measures of income 
persistence, but rather more mobile in terms of class fluidity, the difference can be explained 
by the extent of income mobility, we shall return to this argument below.  Blanden, Gregg 
and Macmillan (2008) make a similar argument about the relationship between social class 
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fluidity and income mobility in the UK; asserting that the transmission of income inequality 
within classes is essential to explaining differences in results across approaches. 
 
 
3 Is There A Consensus? 
 
 
Income mobility 
 
The comparison of intergenerational income elasticities has become a reasonably well worn 
path, with studies by Solon (2002) Corak (2006) d‟Annio (2007) and Björklund and Jäntti 
(2008) all seeking to draw together the international evidence on mobility. The introduction 
to income mobility provided in Section 2 has outlined the crucial measurement issues which 
can cause estimates of income mobility to be biased.  It is essential that the estimates of 
mobility chosen for different countries are similar in their approach to measurement error and 
the age at which income is measured for each generation.  In addition, as income mobility 
may change over time it is important that comparisons are made for cohorts as close in birth 
date as possible. My preferred estimates are for cohorts born in the late 1950s or early 1960s 
and I consider the relationship between the earnings of fathers and sons. 
 
The selected estimates are listed in Table 1.  They are based on two techniques, OLS using a 
time average of fathers earnings (based on around 5 years of data) and TSIV where fathers‟ 
earnings are predicted on the basis of his other characteristics.  As discussed in the 
methodology section, we would expect the TSIV estimates to be upward biased compared to 
those based on OLS.  Here I follow Corak (2006) in scaling down the TSIV estimates to 
make them more comparable.  This is done on the basis of the bias detected in Solon (1992) 
and Björklund and Jäntti (1997), in both cases the OLS estimates based on the US PSID are 
smaller than those based on IV approaches by a factor of 0.75.  This is only a rough estimate 
of the likely bias in other countries, but seems preferable to leaving the estimates uncorrected.   
 
For the UK Dearden, Machin and Reed (1997) uses IV approaches for the 1958 cohort to get 
an estimate of 0.58, this is scaled down to give 0.435, however this is extremely high 
compared to the estimate from the British Household  Panel Study given in Ermisch and 
Nicoletti (2007), which is 0.29 for the relevant cohort.  In order to recognise the fact that 
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„There is a lot of uncertainty about the UK‟ (Björklund and Jäntti, 2008) we average the two 
estimates to give our preferred figure.  This is in contrast to other surveys; Solon (2002) and 
Corak (2002) rely exclusively on Dearden, Machin and Reed, while Björklund and Jäntti 
(2008) prefer Ermisch and Nicoletti‟s estimate.  
 
Figure 1 provides a visual comparison of our preferred estimates of intergenerational income 
persistence.  There are 12 countries represented, and as we shall see this is small compared to 
the number of countries for which there is information on education and status mobility. 
While it is tempting to immediately form the estimates into a „league table‟ we must pay 
attention to the size of the standard errors; these are large in many cases.    Although it does 
seem to be the case that the Nordic nations have higher mobility, it is impossible to 
statistically distinguish the estimates for Sweden and the US. The appropriate ranking at the 
top end is difficult with large standard errors on the Australian, French, British and US 
estimates making it unclear how these countries should be ranked.  
 
Brazil sticks out clearly at the top of the graph as having low mobility (which is quite 
precisely measured).  This is our first evidence that they may be stark differences between 
estimates of mobility for developed and developing countries or across different regions of 
the world.  Grawe (2004) considers mobility for a broader range of countries and finds 
persistence in Ecuador, in particular, to be far higher than any estimate for developed 
countries.  
 
The study by Andrews and Leigh (forthcoming) provides estimates of mobility for 15 nations 
using a TSIV methodology with the explicit purpose of considering the relationship between 
mobility and inequality.  In this study Andrews and Leigh report both intergenerational 
elasticities and correlations and we use these to supplement the picture painted in Figure 1 
(few of the studies used in Table 1 also report correlations).   Figure 2 shows the estimates of 
mobility from this study.  The set of countries considered here is rather different from those 
in Figure 1, but there is some similarity in the ranking, Sweden, Canada and Germany are 
fairly mobile, and the South American country included, Chile, is highly immobile.  There is 
however some changing of the ordering of countries with the US appearing slightly more 
mobile than Australia.  Overall the figures in Figure 1 are preferred as they are based on an 
extensive literature review, but the information from Andrews and Leigh is a useful 
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robustness check providing information on more countries as well as measures of the 
intergenerational correlation.
 6
  
 
 
Social status and class fluidity 
 
Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) provided an analysis of international comparisons of social 
class fluidity for the 1970s which has been recently updated in Breen (2004). The discussion 
of cross national similarities and differences in both Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and 
Breen (2004) is incredibly rich with a great deal of detail concerning the extent of mobility 
between particular classes.  
 
Both studies also provide summary measures from the UniDiff model.  These are included 
here in Figures 3 and 4.  In the earlier study the average extent of mobility is normed to 0 
while in Breen this normalisation is on 1.   Our discussion of mobility so far has indicated 
notable differences between the Nordic nations and the US.  As discussed by Björklund and 
Jäntti (2000) and revealed clearly in Figure 3 Sweden and US both appear to be rather high 
mobility nations when measured by social class in the 1970s. Germany has the least mobility 
in Breen (2004) and is among the lower mobility nations in Erikson and Goldthorpe (the 
sample of comparator countries is rather different), this is in contrast to our earlier results for 
income mobility for which Germany looks rather mobile.  It should be noted that Erikson and 
Goldthorpe consider mobility for all sons in the 1970s, they will be including those born 
several decades before the 1960s; the main cohort considered for our summary measure of 
income mobility.  
 
Breen updates the UniDiff model up to the 1990s, again selecting all adult males rather than a 
particular cohort.  His results for the most recent time period are given in the final bar for 
each country in Figure 4.  Once again we see striking differences between these results and 
those for income mobility, the least mobile country is Germany, and Poland is found to be 
one of the most mobile countries (in contrast Andrews and Leigh found it to have high 
income persistence). There are clearly some striking differences between international 
                                                 
6
 The TSIV estimations in this paper are based on finely graded occupation.  This means that the estimates 
obtained will lie somewhere between a pure income and a social status approach. Differences in rankings 
between Figures 1 and 2 can be interpreted in this light.   
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rankings of mobility depending on whether they are measured by income or social class. 
Some of these differences might be explicable by dramatic changes in mobility across cohorts 
(this might be the case for Poland) but it seems unlikely that they are all explained by this.  
One plausible explanation is that within social class, differences in income mobility are 
sufficiently large such that the two measures do not correspond.  We might anticipate such an 
effect with such large class groupings. An alternative is that the class groupings used are not 
equally good at representing the true occupational structure across nations. We next turn to 
results for status mobility to see if these results also differ to such an extent.  
 
Ganzeboom and Treiman (2007a and 2007b) have been kind enough to supply some results 
from their latest international comparison of status mobility. Their results are based on 
pooling useable observations on fathers‟ and sons‟ occupations from a variety of data sources 
and then attempting to understand why correlations vary according by context, where a 
context is defined by the interaction of country, labour market entry cohort (5 year categoeis) 
and years of experience (10 year categories).  As the authors have supplied the correlations 
by context we need to decide which is most comparable with the other results presented here. 
Our selected group are those entering the labour market in 1980-1985, whose occupations are 
observed with between 10 and 20 years of experience. Year of entry into the labour market is 
based on the year that education ended, so these cohorts were born between the mid-1950s 
and the late-1960s.  
 
Figure 5 provides a graph of the correlations between fathers‟ International Socio-Economic 
Index (ISEI) and sons‟ ISEI across countries.  This provides information on a larger number 
of countries than we have seen so far.  As far as we can say, it seems that many of the 
patterns in the intergenerational income mobility literature are repeated: Norway and Canada 
are among the highest mobility countries while Brazil, France, Chile and Poland (along with 
other less developed nations and southern European countries) are at the other end of the 
scale.  Once again the US and Sweden are close together in the centre of the graph.   
Germany‟s position is more similar to its ranking by income mobility than class fluidity. As 
with the income elasticities presented in Figure 1, it is noticeable that the standard errors are 
large, giving few clear differences between countries. 
 
There are caveats to be borne in mind when using these results.  It seems natural to consider 
the extent to which estimates vary within nations; how would the picture in Figure 5 look if 
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we had chosen a different cohort or experience level? Different measures for the same 
country are generally positively related but the correlation is not high (about .3 for the same 
cohort at different experience levels).  It seems likely that this weak association is attributable 
to the mix of different data sources used to estimate the correlations, unfortunately the data 
provided does not allow us to assess the influence of the source dataset on the results.  The 
dependence of the year at labour market entry on the education level means that the year of 
birth is negatively correlated with the time spent in education for our selected sample, a 
feature not present in the other estimating samples we use.     
 
A limited review of the extensive social class and status mobility literature indicates that, 
despite the limitations of the estimates used here, measures of status appear to be capturing 
something similar to measures of income mobility while measures of class are more 
divergent.  Notable exceptions to this statement are the US and Sweden which appear at 
opposite ends of the intergenerational income mobility ranking but are found rather more 
close together in the middle of the distribution when intergenerational associations are 
measured by status or class. Germany appears to be more immobile by class or status 
measures than it does by income.  We will attempt an explanation of these findings at the end 
of this section after considering the findings from intergenerational correlations in education.  
 
 
Educational persistence across generations 
 
As mentioned in our discussion of measurement, intergenerational educational associations 
can be computed either for years of education or education categories. Hertz et al (2007) 
measure association using years of education for a large number of countries and results for 
both the regression coefficient and correlation are provided in Table 2.  The first striking 
result is that Hertz et al (2007) find confirmation of two results found for a more limited 
range of countries elsewhere; that intergenerational mobility is low in South America and 
high in the Nordic nations. Of the western nations, Italy and the US are the least mobile as 
measured by the intergenerational correlation in years of education.  Great Britain is 
immobile when measured by the intergenerational elasticity but mobile when measured by 
the correlation.  This difference stems from the low variability in years of schooling for 
parents in the sample (almost everyone left at the end of compulsory schooling) and indicates 
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a limitation of measuring mobility in this way. For all countries in the sample the correlation 
between the coefficient and correlation is 0.40.   
 
Results for the Bartholomew index and Eigen values from Chevalier et al (2009) are provided 
in Table 3, listed here from least to most mobile by the Eigen-value.  The order of nations is 
becoming familiar, with Germany, Chile and Poland at the top and the Nordic countries at the 
bottom.  In this ranking Great Britain appears to be rather immobile, less so than Italy.  In 
contrast the US is in the lower-middle part of the Table in this case only a little less mobile 
than the Nordic nations.  In the remainder of our analysis we take the eigen value as our 
preferred measure of categorical education persistence, because the meaning of this measure 
in terms of the speed at which origins are forgotten seems to have more in common with the 
intergenerational income parameters than the Bartholomex index does.  We use (1-eigen 
value) as this has the same implication - higher equals less mobility – as the other measures 
we have used so far.  
 
To complete this section we consider the relationship between our two preferred measures of 
educational mobility, Hertz et al‟s correlation and 1-eigen value. A scatter plot of these two 
measures is found in Figure 6 and shows a fairly strong relationship between the two 
measures with a correlation of 0.5.   
 
 
What are the similarities and differences? How can they be explained?  
 
Throughout our selected summaries of the income, social class, status and education mobility 
literature, we have made comments on the ways in which the measures and rankings have 
pointed towards common patterns of mobility across nations and we have also drawn 
attention to stark differences in the implications of these literatures for particular countries.   
 
In terms of similarities; South America, other developing nations, southern European nations 
and France tend to have rather limited mobility by all measures. The Nordic countries tend to 
have rather high mobility, although Sweden often appears to be less mobile than the other 
nations. There are also some notable differences between the measures. Generally speaking 
the US appears rather immobile by income and education measures while appearing much 
more mobile by measures of social class and status. Germany in contrast is rather mobile on 
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income but immobile for social class and education. The UK tends to be towards the 
immobile end of the spectrum on all measures. 
 
In Section 2.4 we considered the links between the different notions of intergenerational 
mobility.  These suggest some ways in which differences in results can be reconciled.  As 
discussed in Björklund and Jäntti (2000) the differing results for the US are explicable by the 
fact that it is a high inequality nation, with a large amount of income variation within the 
broad social class measures.   An explanation of the differences for Germany might be lower 
inequalities within class and weaker income returns to class and education.  An alternative 
explanation for the outlying results for social class may be that the ability of Erikson and 
Goldthorpe‟s measure to describing the class structure varies across countries.  This might be 
because differences between the classes (in terms of some underlying latent variable) differs.  
Ganzeboom and Treiman‟s approach should mitigate this to some extent as their index is 
explicitly scaled by income and education, however, as we have seen, the ISEI correlations 
that are currently available have their own problems in terms of robustness and comparability 
with other measures.   
 
Table 4 provides an overall picture of the similarities and differences in the different 
measures by listing the correlation coefficients between them.  In many cases the sample of 
countries used do not overlap very much resulting in rather small sample sizes, we therefore 
would not want to over-emphasise these results.  One thing that is very clear is that while the 
measures of income, education and status links across generations tend to be positively 
correlated this is not the case for the measures of social class fluidity.   It appears that these 
constructs are tapping into rather different mechanisms; we therefore do not include them in 
the rest of our analysis. Note that the two measures of social class fluidity are closely linked 
for the eight countries that have both available; this is true even though they relate to different 
periods.   
 
 
Aside on changes over time 
 
Our analysis so far has concentrated on comparing intergenerational mobility across countries 
for people currently in the labour market, born around 1960.   While we can learn a lot from 
these measures they are obviously not a measure of mobility for those growing up in the 
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policy environment of the 2000s. Before proceeding, it therefore seems worthwhile to make 
some comments about the changes in mobility over time as measured by the four different 
measures and to consider the picture for children growing up today.  
 
The results for the UK included in this paper refer to the period before the fall in 
intergenerational mobility found in Blanden et al (2005).  This picture of a relatively 
unfavourable trend in mobility for the UK is also confirmed by Hertz et al (2007) for 
educational correlations which show an increase over a fifty year period.The latest evidence 
for the UK indicates that this fall in mobility has not continued among cohorts born from the 
mid 1980s onwards (Blanden and Machin, 2008).    
 
Changes in intergenerational income mobility in the US have been considered quite 
extensively in recent years.  Corcoran (2001), Fertig (2003/4) and Mayer and Lopoo (2005) 
all find a fall in intergenerational persistence while studies by Levine and Mazumder (2002) 
and Lee and Solon (2006) have more ambiguous findings.  Aaronson and Mazumder (2007) 
find a rise in the intergenerational elasticity from 1980 to 2000 but no change in the 
intergenerational income correlation.   Results for the US on educational mobility in Hertz et 
al (2007) show a rise in the intergenerational correlation of education.  
 
In the study we draw on for the French results in Table 1, Lefranc and Tannoy (2005) explore 
changes across cohorts considering cohorts born 1937–47, 1945–55 and 1963–73. The last 
two groups may be seen as broadly comparable with those considered for the UK but in 
contrast to the UK results, their estimates of  remain very steady across all three cohorts.  
 
Two studies of changes over time have been carried out for Nordic countries. The analysis 
presented in Bratberg et al. (2005) for Norway compares intergenerational elasticities 
estimated for the 1950 and 1960 cohorts when they were in their early 30s, cohorts which 
slightly predate those used in Blanden et al.‟s (2005) analysis. The authors find a slight 
decline in intergenerational associations for sons. Österbacka (2004) considers this question 
for Finland and finds no clear trend.  
 
In light of the concern that changes in mobility over time might lead to differences in the 
international ranking of countries for children growing up today, Figure 7 taken from 
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Scheutz, Ursprung and Woessman (2005) shows the relationship between family background 
and test scores in TIMSS which seeks to measure the achievement of children in a 
comparative way across nations.  It is noticeable that the US and UK (alongside Germany) 
appear to have rather strong relationships between family background and test scores among 
children growing up today.
7
  For cohorts not yet in the labour market, those in Germany, the 
UK and the US (alongside some developing and transition nations) appear to have the poorest 
prospects for mobility through education.  
 
 
4 Can We Explain The Patterns?  
 
 
This paper has so far provided a (selective) review of the literature on international 
comparisons of intergenerational mobility and found some common themes in the story 
presented by the different approaches.  The next step is to try to explain the differences we 
find between nations. We first consider the theoretical perspectives that have been taken on 
this question before considering the empirical evidence.  
 
Becker and Tomes (1986) provide the original economic model of intergenerational income 
mobility.  The framework is based on the idea that parents make investments in their 
children, in a model where parents and children have perfect access to credit markets there 
will be no direct relationship between parental income and investments.  Any relationship 
between incomes across generations will be driven entirely through the inheritance of 
characteristics rewarded in the labour market (labelled endowments).  Public policy could 
have an important role in encouraging mobility through the school system (weakening the 
heritability of endowments) or by supporting higher education in cases where credit 
constraints are binding.  
 
Solon (2004) builds on the Becker-Tomes framework and provides an economic model which 
explains intergenerational mobility as a function of parental and state investments in children. 
He shows that intergenerational income persistence will be higher if heritability (the genetic 
transmission of endowments) is higher, if the productivity of investment in education is 
                                                 
7
 These rankings are also confirmed by figures from PISA in OECD (2001).  
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higher, if the returns to education are higher and if government investment in human capital 
is less progressive.   Solon also shows that the same parameters are important for generating 
income inequality so that inequality and intergenerational persistence will tend to have a 
positive relationship.  
 
We might also think of other more direct connections between inequality and mobility. If the 
distribution of income is wider in country A than country B children at the bottom may be 
relatively more disadvantaged in country A and will face greater barriers to upward 
movement.  The desire to improve intergenerational mobility in the UK is in part behind the 
policy aim to eradicate child poverty. This paper can only begin to investigate the 
relationship between inequality/poverty and mobility we consider this an area ripe for further 
research.   
 
The preceding discussion leads us to focus on two broad dimensions by which countries may 
differ and which may help to explain differences in the extent of mobility; inequality and the 
education system.  In the remainder of the paper we shall correlate measures of inequality, 
public educational investment and private educational returns with the measures of mobility 
used so far.  
 
 
Cross sectional income inequality 
 
The relationship between mobility and inequality is of considerable interest.  The American 
Dream is based on the hypothesis that cross sectional income inequalities can be offset by 
equality of opportunities, and that inequality should be less of a concern if there is a high 
level of mobility. If greater inequalities go hand-in-hand with fewer opportunities it is much 
more alarming. Our basic picture of Nordic countries at the top of the mobility ranking and 
South America at the bottom certainly points towards a negative correlation between the two, 
and Andrews and Leigh (2008) confirm this statistically.  We check this for the countries we 
have here and experiment with using different measures of inequality and child poverty.  
 
Our inequality measures are predominantly taken from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
which provides cross-nationally comparable estimates for a variety of measures of income 
inequality and child poverty.  Led by the theoretical discussion above we would like to 
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consider inequality measured at two points, when the children were growing up and at the 
point when their adult outcomes are measured. As we have focused on children who  were 
born around 1960 we would ideally require income inequality measures for the 1970s.  The 
number of nations for whom inequality data is available in the LIS increases as we consider 
more recent years.  We start with 1982, but for those countries where this is not available we 
use later years. We supplement this information with income inequality taken from the World 
Bank dataset based on Deininger and Squire (1996), which is also used by Andrews and 
Leigh (2008). This provides inequality measures for the late 1970s/early 1980s.  Information 
on inequality in the adult years is available for 1995 and 2000 from the LIS.
8
  
 
Table 5 provides the correlations between income inequality and our measures of 
intergenerational immobility.  In all cases these are positive.  Nations with high inequality 
tend to have high persistence in social status for all of our measures. Although we would not 
want to make too much of it owing to the small sample sizes used there are some interesting 
variations in the strength of these correlations.   
 
Taking the Table as a whole the majority of correlations are quite large, at over 0.5, 
indicating a strong positive relationship between inequality and intergenerational mobility.  
There are some interesting differences across the measures, with our preferred income beta 
tending to be most strongly correlated with income inequality in adulthood while the other 
measures show a larger association with inequality levels earlier in the relevant cohort‟s life.  
This is not surprising as the income beta is most likely to pick up the influence of labour 
market returns while the other measures are less influenced by this and dependent on the 
opportunities available to the cohort as young people.   
 
It is also notable that we see the income elasticity from Andrews and Leigh is more closely 
related to inequality than is the case for their correlation measure.  Aaronson and Mazumder 
(2007) find that as inequality increased for the US from 1980 onwards the income elasticity 
rose while the income correlation remained constant.  
 
                                                 
8
 An alternative source of inequality information is the share of top incomes, as brought together by Leigh 
(2007b); unfortunately these are only available for seven of the countries for which we have information on 
intergenerational income mobility.  
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There is no consistent evidence that the child poverty measure is more strongly correlated 
with immobility than are the general measures of inequality.  Indeed, rather counter-
intuitively it appears that the measures related to income inequality at the top of the 
distribution (the 90-50 ratio) has a stronger association with immobility than the other 
measures of income inequality, although the size of these differences is too small for us to 
discriminate such patterns with any certainty.  
 
Our theoretical discussion of the relationship between inequality and mobility highlighted 
two possible mechanisms.  One was that inequality and immobility tend to be generated by 
the same factors and that we would therefore expect the two to be correlated at the end of the 
process (when the second-generation are adults). The second is that inequality in childhood 
inhibits equality of opportunity.   The limited evidence presented in Table 5 indicates that it is 
inequality in childhood that matters for the non-income measures while our preferred income 
mobility estimates are also very strongly correlated with inequality in adulthood. This is 
because intergenerational income mobility is influenced by the adult returns to characteristics 
such as education and occupation.  
 
Figures 8a and 8b shows the relationship between the preferred beta and the gini-coefficient 
in the early 1980s and in 1995. This reveals why the correlation with income mobility is 
stronger for inequality measured in 1995 than in the early 1980s.  The two key observations 
seem to be Denmark, for which inequality fell by about an eighth to match the low level of 
intergenerational persistence, and the UK where inequality rose by 25 percent over the 
period.  One should be cautious in interpreting these results as a consequence, especially 
given the large standard error on the British estimate of beta.  
 
This preliminary analysis of the relationship between inequality and mobility has indicated 
several interesting pieces of evidence. 1) There is the expected relationship between 
inequality and mobility.  2) The relationship between mobility and poverty is not driving this, 
inequality at the top is important as well.  3) Inequality in childhood appears crucial for all 
measures, but inequality in adulthood also matters for our preferred measure of income 
persistence.  
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Educational investment  
 
Solon (2004) highlights the importance of the progressivity of educational expenditure as a 
factor leading to greater mobility.   We are rather limited in the way we can operationalise 
this concept, the OECD Education at a Glance provides a large amount of information on 
education spending such as the proportion of spending coming from private and public 
sources, however this information is difficult to obtain for the 1970s.  Instead we use 
information from Barro and Lee‟s (1994) international panel dataset.  This provides 
Government education spending as a proportion of GDP, for both total and recurring 
expenditures.  This measure will certainly compound different aspects; the level of total 
spending relative to GDP, and the extent to which spending on the education is carried out by 
Government. We take average figures from 1965-1969 (the primary school years for the 1960 
cohort) and 1970-1974 (the early secondary school years) and once again correlate these with 
our measures of mobility. 
 
As we would expect, there is a negative relationship between education spending and 
intergenerational persistence.  Those countries which devote more of their income to public 
spending on human capital investment tend to be more mobile.  This correlation is slightly 
stronger with the income beta than with other measures, and these two variables are graphed 
in Figure 9. Interestingly Andrews and Leigh‟s correlation measure is more closely related to 
education spending than their elasticity is, so it is not the case that the previous result that 
elasticities correlate more strongly with inequality is replicated for all the explanators. Total 
education spending tends to be more closely related to mobility than recurring spending and 
there is no consistent pattern on the most important period of schooling, primary or 
secondary. 
 
A possible explanation for the results is that education spending and inequality are picking up 
the same characteristics of nations.  The correlation between the gini coefficient and 
education spending is in the region of -0.3 to -0.5. However some positive evidence comes 
from the status correlation measure; a regression of this on both the World Bank gini and 
educational expenditure in the 1970s gives a significant coefficient of the expected direction 
on both (although the coefficient on inequality is very small in magnitude). However, while 
this is indicative we do not really have enough data to robustly compare the influence of 
individual variables. 
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Returns to education 
 
A further prediction from Solon is that income mobility will be weaker when the returns to 
education are larger. Recall the relationship between intergenerational income mobility in 
country k ( k ) and the correlation in education across generations ( k ). Clearly the return to 
education for the child has a positive relationship with the income k .  We might also 
suspect that k  will have a positive link to the return to education as better educated parents 
will have a greater incentive to invest their extra resources in their children‟s education if the 
return to this is higher.  
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Table 7 gives correlations between our mobility measures and the returns to education as 
listed in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004).  Once again the correlation is as expected.  Two 
measures are used, the average return to a year of education and the return to higher 
education.   The higher education measure is more strongly related to mobility than the 
average measure. This could be interpreted as being because higher education is the most 
important route for intergenerational persistence/mobility, but it may also be the case that the 
higher education return is subject to less measurement error across countries.   Our 
predictions concerning the relative strength of correlations with different measures of 
mobility are also found to be accurate.  Both measures of returns are found to be correlated 
more strongly with income mobility (all three measures of this) than with status or 
educational mobility.  This is because income mobility is influenced by income returns 
through the final outcome (earnings) while educational mobility will only be influenced by 
returns because of the incentives to invest. 
 
Figure 10 shows a scatter-plot of the relationship between higher education returns and the 
income beta. This graph gives further evidence as to why the income and education rankings 
differ for Germany; Germany has a low return to education compared with Italy and France. 
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5 Conclusions 
 
 
While this paper has not provided an exhaustive review of the cross-country literature on 
income, social status and educational mobility across generations it does suggest that these 
literatures all point towards a similar international ranking. Notable exceptions are the US 
and Germany. The US is immobile by our income measure but rather more mobile in terms 
of social status and education whereas for Germany the reverse is true.   
 
Our examination of the factors generating differences in mobility gives a clue to the reason 
for these findings.  Lower mobility tends to be correlated with greater inequality, lower 
educational spending and higher returns to education.  Of all our measures intergenerational 
income mobility is most strongly influenced by inequality and the payoff to education.  This 
provides a hint as to the reasons for the difference in rankings for the US and Germany by 
different measures as there is substantially greater inequality within education and social 
class groupings and higher returns in the US compared to Germany. 
 
Our results on the relationship between inequality and mobility also point towards some other 
conclusions.  The first is that inequality in childhood/youth is strongly related to all our 
measures of intergenerational persistence, with measures of inequality in adulthood most 
strongly related to income mobility. These findings work against the hypothesis that 
inequality and mobility only vary together because they are driven by the same processes.  A 
second finding is that inequality at the top end of the distribution is more strongly linked to 
mobility than inequality at the bottom; it is not simply differences in child poverty that drives 
the inequality-mobility relationship. 
 
In order to derive really solid policy recommendations we would need evidence that as 
education spending, inequality and education returns change so does the rate of mobility, 
with sufficient observations to allow us to unpick the influence of different variables. Some 
evidence on this comes from Blanden et al (2005) who find a fall in mobility at the same time 
as inequality widened in the UK. A really persuasive assessment of these questions would use 
a large panel dataset to link changes in mobility across countries to changes in our other 
variables of interest.  
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Nonetheless: inequality seems to matter for mobility and it appears that this relationship is 
not simply mechanistic. If it were a natural consequence of the way mobility is measured it 
would be found only in measures of income mobility and not for measures of mobility by 
social status and education.  This is not the case; while inequality appears to be most strongly 
associated with income mobility the relationship is clear for all our measures of 
intergenerational persistence.   As emphasised above, it is not just the extent of poverty at the 
bottom end which matters; inequality at the top end has an impact too.  This is worth bearing 
in the mind in the UK where most measures of mobility have levelled off since 1997 but top 
incomes have continued to move away (Brewer et al 2008).  
 
The finding that countries with higher education spending have more mobility also has 
obvious policy implications. However one should be cautious about assuming that any rise in 
spending relative to GDP will have a positive effect on mobility; we do not know enough at 
this stage about how the money must be spent to be effective. That said, the UK has had a 
strong recent positive trend in education spending, it has increased from 4.5% in 1997/98 to 
5.7% in 2006/07 (HM Treasury).     
 
Coming to our third explanatory variable, the returns to education, it is not obvious that 
Governments should seek to reduce this as an end in itself.  However it is the case that as 
more young people become highly qualified and educational opportunities are expanded the 
returns are likely to fall due to a rise in supply.  An even expansion in educational 
qualifications across all family backgrounds will therefore have a „double whammy‟ effect on 
mobility, reducing the heritability of education and the reward to education in terms of 
income. 
 
This survey paper cannot hope to build a comprehensive picture of the drivers of mobility 
across different countries without more data on changes across countries and over time.  The 
findings presented are instead suggestive, with inequality, education spending and 
educational returns all found to have the expected relationship with mobility.  With a few 
notable exceptions the literature on income, status and educational mobility seems to point to 
a similar ranking of countries.  This indicates that important lessons can be learned from all 
of these literatures.  
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Table 1: Preferred estimates of income mobility 
 
Country Source Elasticity 
Brazil Dunn (2007) (scaled) 0.52 (0.011) 
US Solon (1992) 0.41 (0.09) 
UK  Dearden, Machin and Reed (1997) 
(scaled) and averaged with Nicoletti 
and Ermisch (2007) 
0.37 (0.05) 
Italy Piraino (2007) (scaled) 0.33  (0.026) 
France Lefranc and Trannoy (2005) (scaled) 0.32 (0.045) 
Norway Nilsen et al (2008) 0.25 (0.006) 
Australia Leigh (2007a) revised as in 
Björklund and Jäntti (2008) 
0.25 (.080)  
Germany Vogel (2006) 0.24 (.053) 
Sweden Björklund and Chadwick (2003) 0.24 (0.011) 
Canada Corak and Heisz (1999) 0.23 (0.01) 
Finland Pekkarinen et al. (2006) 
Österbacka (2001) 
Averaged as in Björklund and Jäntti 
(2008) 
0.20 (.020) 
Denmark Munk et al (2008) 0.14 (0.004) 
 
Note: Estimates based on two-stage instrumental variables regressions are scaled down by 0.75 
to allow a legitimate comparison to be made with those based on OLS and time averaging.  This 
reflects the difference in these estimates found for the US in Solon (1992) and Björklund and 
Jäntti (1997).  
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Table 2: Measures of Association in Years of Schooling 
 
 Elasticity Rank Correlation Rank 
Peru 0.88 6 0.66 1 
Ecuador 0.72 12 0.61 2 
Panama 0.73 11 0.61 3 
Chile 0.64 18 0.60 4 
Brazil 0.95 4 0.59 5 
Colombia 0.80 8 0.59 6 
Nicaragua 0.82 7 0.55 7 
Indonesia 0.78 9 0.55 8 
Italy 0.67 17 0.54 9 
Slovenia 0.54 27 0.52 10 
Egypt 1.03 2 0.50 11 
Hungary 0.61 20 0.49 12 
Sri Lanka 0.61 19 0.48 13 
Pakistan 1.00 3 0.46 14 
USA 0.46 33 0.46 15 
Switzerland 0.49 30 0.46 16 
Ireland 0.70 15 0.46 17 
South Africa 0.69 16 0.44 18 
Poland 0.48 31 0.43 19 
Vietnam 0.58 23 0.40 20 
Philippines 0.41 36 0.40 21 
Belgium 0.41 35 0.40 22 
Estonia 0.54 28 0.40 23 
Sweden 0.58 26 0.40 24 
Ghana 0.71 13 0.39 25 
Ukraine 0.37 40 0.39 26 
East Timor 1.27 1 0.39 27 
Bangladesh 0.58 25 0.38 28 
Slovakia 0.61 21 0.37 29 
Czech Republic 0.44 34 0.37 30 
Netherlands 0.58 24 0.36 31 
Norway 0.40 38 0.35 32 
Nepal 0.94 5 0.35 33 
New Zealand 0.40 37 0.33 34 
Finland 0.48 32 0.33 35 
Northern Ireland 0.59 22 0.32 36 
Great Britain 0.71 14 0.31 37 
Malaysia 0.38 39 0.31 38 
Denmark 0.49 29 0.30 39 
Kyrgyztan 0.20 42 0.28 40 
China (rural) 0.34 41 0.20 41 
Ethiopia (rural) 0.75 10 0.10 42 
 
Source: Table 2 of Hertz et al (2007)  
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Table 3: Intergenerational Mobility Parameters 
from Transition Matrices of Educational Level 
 
 Bartholomew 
index 
Rank Eigen-value Rank 
Germany 0.684 2 0.518 1 
Chile 1.024 14 0.562 2 
Poland 0.977 11 0.612 3 
Switzerland 0.642 1 0.641 4 
Czech Republic 1.010 13 0.643 5 
Slovenia 0.709 3 0.653 6 
Great Britain 1.059 17 0.655 7 
Netherlands 0.725 4 0.677 8 
Northern Ireland 1.067 18 0.679 9 
Italy 0.878 6 0.681 10 
Ireland 1.027 15 0.700 11 
Canada 1.067 19 0.704 12 
New Zealand 0.967 10 0.711 13 
USA 1.049 16 0.713 14 
Hungary 0.749 5 0.718 15 
Sweden 0.927 7 0.722 16 
Denmark 0.993 12 0.747 17 
Norway 0.965 9 0.810 18 
Belgium 
(Flanders) 
1.102 20 0.817 19 
Finland 0.937 8 0.905 20 
 
Source:  Figures are from Chevalier, Denny and McMahon (2007) and were kindly provided by 
Kevin Denny.  
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Table 4: Correlations between different intergenerational mobility measures 
 
 Preferred 
Income β 
Andrews 
and Leigh 
income  β 
Andrews 
and Leigh 
income 
correlation 
E & G β Breen β 
(1990s) 
Status corr 
1980 
cohort 
exp= 15 
Years of 
ed corr 
Andrews and 
Leigh income  
β 
0.291 [6]       
Andrews and 
Leigh income 
correlation 
0.352 [6] 0.973 [16]      
E & G β 
 
0.035 [8] -0.354 [7] -0.281 [7]     
Breen β 
(1990s) 
 
-0.315  [5] -0.323 [4] -0.351 [4] 0.687 [8]    
Status corr 
1980 cohort 
exp= 15 
0.779 [9] 0.301 [15] 0.357 [15] 0.405 [11] 0.195 [7]   
Years of 
education 
correlation 
0.732 [6] 0.695 [9] 0.644 [9] -0.122 [10] -0.526 [7] 0.454 [19]  
1-Eigen value 
 
0.319 [10] 0.415 [10] 0.454 [10] 0.120 [11] 0.224 [8] 0.350[16] 0.488 [18] 
 
Note: The number of countries used to calculate the correlation is given in square brackets. 
 
Table 5: Correlations between inequality and intergenerational mobility 
 
 Preferred 
Income β 
Andrews 
and Leigh 
income  β 
Andrews 
and Leigh 
income 
correlation 
Status 
correlation 
Years of 
education 
correlation 
1-Eigen 
value 
LIS measures  
early-mid 1980s 
      
Income gini 0.58 [11] 0.60 [9] 0.55 [9] 0.53 [18] 0.63  [13] 0.439 [15] 
Atkinson 
coefficient ε=0.5 
0.58 [11] 0.56 [9] 0.50 [9] 0.55 [18] 0.62  [13] 0.398 [15] 
90/10 0.59 [11] 0.50 [9] 0.43 [9] 0.33 [18] 0.56 [13] 0.289 [15] 
90/50 0.65 [11] 0.64 [9] 0.57 [9] 0.51 [18] 0.64 [13] 0.460 [15] 
80/20 0.61 [11] 0.59 [9] 0.53 [9] 0.37 [18] 0.51 [13] 0.338 [15] 
Child poverty 0.64 [11] 0.50 [9] 0.46 [9] 0.31 [18] 0.54 [13] 0.212 [15] 
 
World Bank 
measure late 
1970s – early 
1980s 
      
Income gini 0.64 [12] 0.55 [13] 0.43 [13] 0.41 [22] 0.49 [22] 0.154 [16] 
       
Later LIS 
inequality 
      
Gini 1995 0.87 [11] -0.13 [9] -0.07 [9] 0.27 [15] 0.49 [13] 0.428 [16] 
Gini 2000 0.84 [11] -0.10 [10] -0.15 [10] -0.11 [18] 0.33 [15] 0.282 [16] 
 
Note: The number of countries used to calculate the correlation is given in square brackets. 
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Table 6: Correlations between education spending and intergenerational mobility 
 
 Education 
spend % GDP 
1965-1969 
Education 
spend % GDP 
1970-1974 
Recurring 
education 
spend % GDP 
1965-1969 
Recurring 
education 
spend % GDP 
1970-1974 
Preferred Income 
β 
-0.566 [12] -0.627 [12] -0.594 [12] -0.573 [12] 
Andrews and 
Leigh income  β 
-0.365 [10] -0.461 [10] -0.350 [10] -0.448 [10] 
Andrews and 
Leigh income 
correlation 
-0.405 [10] -0.529 [10] -0.392 [10] -0.503 [10] 
Status correlation -0.539 [20] -0.588 [20] -0.538 [21] -0.543 [20] 
 
Years of 
education 
correlation 
-0.462 [21] -0.498 [22] -0.434 [23] -0.487 [22] 
1-Eigen value 
 
-0.547 [15] -0.393[15] -0.617 [15] -0.438 [15] 
 
Note: The number of countries used to calculate the correlation is given in square brackets. 
 
 
Table 7: Correlations between education returns and intergenerational mobility 
 
 
 Returns to each year of 
education 
Returns to higher 
education 
Preferred Income β 0.625 [13] 0.826 [9] 
Andrews and Leigh income  β 0.559 [12] 0.797 [9] 
Andrews and Leigh income 
correlation 
0.498 [12] 0.798 [9] 
Status correlation 0.250 [25] 0.502 [18] 
Years of education correlation 0.278 [32] 0.318 [22] 
1-Eigen value 
 
0.275 [15] 0.549 [11] 
 
Note: The number of countries used to calculate the correlation is given in square brackets. 
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Figure 1: Preferred Intergenerational Income Parameters 
 
 
 
Sources for these estimates are listed in Table 1 and Appendix Table 1. Lines give 95% 
confidence intervals.  
 
 
Figure 2: Intergenerational income elasticities and correlations  
from Andrews and Leigh (2008) 
 
 
  Source: Table A1 in Andrews and Leigh (2008) 
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Figure 3: Parameters from Erikson and Goldthorpe Social Class Fluidity Model 
 
 
  Source: Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) Table 11.1 
 
 
Figure 4: Parameters from Social Class Fluidity Models from Breen (2004) 
 
 
  Source: Breen (2004)  Figure 3.3. With thanks to Richard Breen for providing these figures.  
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Figure 5: Ranking of Countries by Intergenerational Status Correlation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Figures were kindly provided by Harry Ganzeboom, Ganzeboom and Treiman (2007b).  They give the 
correlation in socio-economic status between sons and fathers for sons who joined the labour market between 
1980 and 1990 and whose occupations were observed 10-20 years later.  Lines show 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 6: The relationship between our two measures of educational mobility 
 
Swiss
USA
Ireland
Nether
Poland
Sweden
New Zeal
GBrit
NIrel
Belgium
Italy
Norway
Slovenia
Czech
Denmark
Finland
Hungary
Chile
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.3 .4 .5 .6
Correlation in years of education
1-Eigen value Fitted values
 
Source: Figures from Tables 2 and 3. Correlation between two measures is .49, regression line has 
slope 0.45. If Chile is excluded the correlation and coefficients reduce to around 0.33.  
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Figure 7: Estimated Effects of Family Background 
on Students’ Test Scores Across Countries 
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Note. Family background effects are based on reported measures of the number of books at home; test scores are 
average maths and science scores from TIMSS. The family background effects are estimated from statistical 
regressions explaining standardised test scores based on the number of books at home. As standardised test 
scores have an international standard deviation of 100, these effects can be interpreted as percentages of an 
international standard deviation by which test achievement increases if the number of books is raised by one 
category. The authors validate these estimates by also looking at other measures of family background from the 
2001 Progress in International Reading Literacy Survey (PIRLS).  
Source: Scheutz, Ursprung and Woessman (2005).  
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Figure 8: Associations between the Income Beta and Gini-coefficient 
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Figure 9: Association between Income Beta and Education Expenditure 
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Figure 10: Relationship between the Income Beta and  
the Return to Higher Education 
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Table A1: Summary of international literature on intergenerational persistence for sons 
 
 
 
Study 
Country  Data source Son’s outcome variable Parental income variable Approach to 
measurement error  
ˆ  ˆ  
        
Solon (1992) USA Panel Survey of 
Income Dynamics 
Log annual earnings in 1984, 
ages 25–33. 
Log annual earnings, 1967–72. Five-year average of 
father‟s earnings. 
  0.41   (0.09)  
   Log annual earnings in 1984, 
ages 25–33. 
Log annual earnings in 1967. Father‟s education 
used as an 
instrumental 
variable. 
  0.53 (0.014)  
Zimmerman 
(1992) 
USA National Longitudinal 
Survey 
Log annual earnings in 1981, 
ages 29–39. 
Log annual earnings over 1966–
71. 
Four-year average of 
father‟s earnings. 
  0.54   (0.08)  
   Log annual earnings in 1981, 
ages 29–39. 
Log annual earnings in 1971. Duncan Index used 
as instrumental 
variable.  
  0.67 (0.15)  
Mazumder (2002) USA Survey of Income and 
Program Participation 
matched to Social 
Security Record 
Log of average earnings over 
1995–98; sons born 1963–68.  
Log annual earnings over 1970–
85. 
16-year average of 
father‟s earnings. 
  0.58 (0.11)  
Couch and Dunn 
(1997) 
Germany 
and the 
USA 
German Socio-
Economic Panel and 
PSID 
Log annual earnings averaged 
over 1984–89, sons on average 
aged 23 in Germany, 25 in the 
USA. 
Log annual earnings averaged 
over 1984–89. 
Five-year averages Germany:   
0.11 (0.06) 
USA:           
0.13 (0.06) 
 
Wiegand (1997) Germany German Socio-
Economic Panel 
Log monthly earnings in 1994; 
sons aged 27–33. 
Log monthly earnings averaged 
over 1984–89. 
Five-year average  0.32           
(0.07) 
 
Vogel (2008) Germany German Socio-
Economic Panel 
Sons observed in 2003 at ages 
25-50 with average 34.4. Thus 
they were born: 1953-78. 
Fathers observed at  ages 27-56 
with average 43.4.   
Five-year average 0.246 (.084)  
Björklund and 
Jäntti (1997) 
Sweden 
and the 
USA 
Swedish Level of 
Living Survey and 
PSID 
Log annual earnings in 1990, 
sons born 1952–61.  
Father‟s earnings predicted from 
observables in a separate dataset. 
Two-sample 
instrumental 
variables (TSIV) 
Sweden:      
0.36 (0.11) 
USA: 
0.52 (0.14) 
Sweden: 0.29 
(0.09) 
USA: 0.41 
(0.11) 
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Gustafsson (1994) Sweden Matched register and 
tax data, for fathers in 
Stockholm 1955  
Four-year average of log 
individual income; sons born 
1939–45.  
Father‟s individual income in 
1955.  
Four-year average  0.14             
(0.07)  
 
Österberg (2000) Sweden Matched register data Sons aged 25 and over in 
1990, earnings averaged 1990-
1992 
Fathers‟ average earnings in 
1978-1980 
Three-year average .129 (.011)  
Björklund and 
Chadwick (2003) 
Sweden Matched register data Sons born 1962-1965,  
earnings observed in 1999. 
Father‟s income averaged from 
1970-1975 
Five-year average 0.24 (0.01)  
Hirvonen (2007) Sweden Matched register data Sons born 1960-1966 earnings 
averaged over 1997-2000 
Parental income averaged 1970-
1975. 
Five-year average 0.275 (0.004)  
Österbacka (2001) Finland  Finnish quinquenniel 
population census 
Log average annual earnings 
in 1985, 1995, 2000; sons born 
1950–60.  
Log average annual earnings in 
1970 and 1975.  
Two-year average 
but five years apart  
 0.13        
(0.005) 
0.156 (.006) 
Pekkarinen et al. 
(2006) 
Finland Finnish quinquenniel 
population census 
Son‟s earnings in 2000 at ages 
34-40, born 1960-66. 
Father‟s earnings averaged over 
1970,1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 at 
an unknown age. 
Average over 5 
periods, in total 20 
years apart.  
0.25-0.30 
(around 0.020) 
 
Nilsen et al (2008) Norway Matched register data Sons earnings averaged over 
ages 36-40; born 1959-1962. 
Father‟s earnings averaged over 
different periods.  Fathers born 
1927-1942. 
Time averaging, as 
reported in next 
column 
67-71: .338 
72-76: .282 
77-81: .253  
82-86: .163 
67-86: .320 
 
Hussein, Munk 
and Bonke (2008) 
Denmark Matched register data Son‟s annual earnings in 2000 
at ages 30-40, born 1960-
1970. 
Father‟s aunnual earnings 
averaged over 1984-1988 when 
aged 30-66. 
Average over 5 
years 
0.136 (0.004) Not reported 
Corak and Heisz 
(1999) 
Canada Matched income tax 
data 
Log annual earnings in 1995; 
sons born 1963–66. 
Father‟s log annual earnings 
averaged over 1978–82. 
Five-year average of 
father‟s earnings 
 0.23          
(0.01) 
 
Atkinson 
(1981) 
UK Follow-up of 
Rowntree York 
Sample 
Log weekly earnings at survey 
date (1975–78). 
Log weekly earnings in 1950. None  0.36           
(0.03) 
 
Dearden et al. 
(1997) 
UK National Child 
Development Survey 
Log weekly earnings at age 33 
for a cohort born in 1958. 
Father‟s log weekly earnings 
when son aged 16.  
Instrumental 
variables using 
father‟s education 
and social class 
 0.58          
(0.06) 
OLS results 
are 0.24 (.027)  
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Nicoletti and 
Ermisch (2007) 
UK British Household 
Panel Survey 
Average log earnings over 
1991-2003 for sons born 
1952-1970 
Information on occupation 
education and age of fathers used 
to predict their earnings. 
Prediction is from older men in 
1991 or as close to as possible. 
Two-sample 
instrumental 
variables (TSIV) 
0.29 (0.06)      
Lefranc and 
Trannoy (2005) 
France French Education–
Training–Employment 
surveys 1964–93 
(FQP) 
Log annual earnings for sons 
aged 30–40, 1993 FQP. 
Information on father‟s education 
and social class used to predict 
earnings from similar-aged men 
in FQP.  
Two-sample 
instrumental 
variables (TSIV) 
Approx. 0.4  
Piraino (2007) Italy Bank of Italy Survey 
on Household Income 
and Wealth (SHIW) 
Log annual earnings in 2000, 
2002, 2004 for 30–45 year-
olds whose fathers were born 
between 1927 and 1949.  
Information on father‟s 
education, employment status 
occupation and region used to 
predict income from men in 
1977–79 SHIW aged 30–50. 
Two-sample 
instrumental 
variables (TSIV) 
 0.435         
(0.035) 
 
Mocetti (2007) Italy SHIW as above Log annual earnings in 2000, 
2002, 2004 for 30–50 year-
olds. 
Information on education, sector, 
region and occupational 
qualification used to predict 
income from men in 1977–80 
aged 30–50.  
Two-sample 
instrumental 
variables (TSIV) 
 0.499        
(0.051) 
 
Leigh (2007)  Australia Household Income and 
Labour Dynamics in 
Australia 
Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics 
Log annual earnings in 2004 
for sons aged 25-54.  
Average earnings in 2004 for 
men in father‟s occupation where 
father‟s occupation is recalled by 
adult son.  
Two-sample 
instrumental 
variables (TSIV) 
Australia: 
0.2-0.3 
US: 0.4-0.6 
Correlation 
likely smaller 
than elasticity 
Dunn (2007)  Brazil PNAD cross-sectional 
data 
Log annual earnings in 1996 
for sons aged 25-34.  
 
Earnings are predicted from 
father‟s education, education and 
earnings relationship is obtained 
from males aged 30-50 in the 
1976 survey. 
 
Two-sample 
instrumental 
variables (TSIV) 
0.688 (0.014)  
 
